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NODIS
FOR Z. BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 20142 ACTIN SEC STATE DEC 4

QUOTE S E C R E T CAIRO 20142

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PINT PINR EG XF
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DRAFT MEMORANDUM:
"CONSEQUENCES OF A MOVE BY SADAT TO MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE
WITH ISRAEL"

REF: STATE 288648

1. AM IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH ANALYSIS SET FORTH
REFTEL, ALTHOUGH MY EMPHASIS MIGHT BE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT.
2. IN MY JUDGMENT, SADAT UNDERTOOK HIS BOLD INITIATIVES
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BECAUSE HE SENSED THAT PEACE WAS SLIPPING AWAY FROM HIM
OVER PROCEDURAL ISSUES. DESPITE OCCASIONAL MILITANT
PUBLIC COMMENTS, WHICH HAVE TROUBLED THE ISRAELIS, THE
FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT SADAT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THAT
HE BADLY NEEDS PEACE. HIS DILEMMA HAS BEEN THAT EGYPT
CANNOT REALISTICALLY AFFORD ANOTHER WAR, YET IN TERMS OF
ITS CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD CANNOT APPEAR
TO BE SUPINELY ACCEPTING ANY ISRAELI DIKTAT. GAMASY HAS
ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION IN THE PAST THREE YEARS
PRACTICALLY BEGGED ME TO ENSURE THAT USG MOVES ACTIVELY

TO BRING ABOUT PEACE. AS A PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, HE HAS SAID THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IS PREPARED TO DO ITS DUTY IF CALLED UPON, BUT HE HAS ALSO BEEN UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN DEFEAT, THIS TIME PERHAPS MORE DISASTROUS THAN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

3. IN UNDERTAKING HIS BOLD INITIATIVES, SADAT HAD TO JUDGE DOMESTIC AND OVERALL ARAB REACTION. I KNOW THAT JUST PRIOR TO HIS TRIP TO JERUSALEM, HIS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SOUGHT TO COME UP WITH THE BEST ESTIMATE OF HOW MUCH EGYPTIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT SADAT COULD EXPECT. IT CAME UP WITH AN ESTIMATE OF ABOUT 70 PERCENT, BUT EVEN NSC MEMBERS WERE ASTONISHED AT SADAT'S OVERWHELMING HOMECOMING RECEPTION, WHICH THEY INTERPRETED AS INDICATING EVEN GREATER PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN PEACE INITIATIVES THAN THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY CALCULATED. AS INDICATED IN SEVERAL MESSAGES REPORTING MY POST-JERUSALEM MEETINGS WITH SADAT, HE WAS TREMENDOUSLY BUOYED UP BY HIS RECEPTION IN CAIRO (EVEN MORE SO THAN IN JERUSALEM) AND THIS UNDOUBTEDLY ENCOURAGED HIM TO CALL FOR A CAIRO PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. SADAT HAS COME TO REALIZE MORE THAN EVER BEFORE THAT THERE IS A TREMENDOUS GROUND-SWELL FOR PEACE ON THE PART OF THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC, AND
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HE BELIEVES ON THE PART OF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY, AND IS RIDING THE CREST OF THAT WAVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SOUGHT FURTHER DIRECT MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS, SUCH AS THE CAIRO PREPARATORY CONFERENCE WILL OFFER. HE HOPED THAT SOME OF THE OTHER ARABS MIGHT PARTICIPATE, BUT I DOUBT THAT HE REALLY THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS LIKELY. HENCE, HE MADE HIS DECISION IN THE EXPECTATION THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO GO TO SUCH A CONFERENCE ALONE.

4. RE PARA 3 REFTTEL, SADAT HAS THUS FAR CONSISTENTLY STATED, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, THAT HE WANTS TO WORK OUT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. HE HAS RESISTED ISRAELI OVERTURES, AS HAS HIS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, TO CONCLUDE A BILATERAL AGREEMENT. HIS STATED PURPOSE FOR CAIRO CONFERENCE IS TO WORK OUT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. HE HAS SAID THAT IF THIS PROVES POSSIBLE, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE OTHER CONFRONTATION STATES, HE WILL CALL AN ARAB SUMMIT AND SUBMIT WHATEVER DRAFT EMERGES TO THE SUMMIT FOR CONSIDERATION. THE OTHERS WILL THEN BE FREE TO ACCEPT OR NOT, BUT HE WOULD GO HIS OWN WAY IF NECESSARY. HE MIGHT NOT, OF COURSE, BE ABLE TO CONVENE AN ARAB SUMMIT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES HE ENVISAGES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL OFFER HIM THE KIND OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT THAT HE COULD PRESENT TO AN ARAB SUMMIT AS A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. I SUSPECT THAT WHAT THE ISRAELIS WILL REGARD AS A

GENEROUS SETTLEMENT WILL STILL FALL FAR SHORT OF MINIMAL ARAB REQUIREMENTS. SADAT RECOGNIZES THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT LOOKS TO "USG PRESSURE" ON ISRAEL TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. HIS IMPRESSIONS OF BEGIN, WEIZMAN AND DAYAN (AND PARTICULARLY THE LATTER TWO) AS A RESULT OF HIS TRIP TO JERUSALEM MAY ALSO BE CAUSING HIM TO INDULGE SOME WITHFUL THINKING THAT THERE IS A GREATER DEGREE OF ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY THAN ON THE SURFACE AT LEAST SEEMS TO BE THE CASE.

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5. THUS, SADAT MAY BEFORE LONG COME UP AGAINST THE HARD REALITY THAT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE OF THE TYPE THAT HE WANTS IS NOT FEASIBLE, AT LEAST FOR NOW. HE WILL THEN HAVE TO LOOK FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND, INITIALLY AT LEAST, FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN A BILATERAL. IN PARTICULAR, HE WILL TRY TO WORK OUT SOME KIND OF A PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT. AS DEPT AWARE, HE IS STILL TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF TURNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OVER TO UNEF FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AFTER WHICH SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD BE ALLOWED. HE IS AWARE OF ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES ON THE WEST BANK AND HAS ALSO BEEN TOYING WITH THE FALLBACK IDEA OF URGING THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE IN GAZA, UNDER UNEF, AND HAS TALKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE WILLINGNESS TO CEDE EGYPTIAN RAFAH AND PERHAPS EVEN YAMIT TO SUCH A STATE. THIS WOULD BE A LESS-THAN-PERFECT SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, BUT HE SEEMS TO THINK THAT IT COULD PERHAPS BE SOLD TO SOME PALESTINIANS AS A REASONABLE, TEMPORARY STEP. WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD EVEN BUY THIS KIND OF A TRUNCATED PALESTINIAN STATE IS A MOOT POINT.

6. IN ANY CASE, IN HIS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, HE HAS OF LATE BEEN LESS INSISTENT THAT THE PLO IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND HAS AT LEAST BEEN LOOKING FOR OTHER NASCENT PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DEPT WILL HAVE NOTED THAT HIS RECENT UTTERANCES SPEAK OF THE "PALESTINIANS", NOT THE PLO. HE IS CURRENTLY DISGUSTED WITH ARAFAT AND THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, PREPARED TO IGNORE THEM. HOWEVER, SHOULD ARAFAT SEEK A WAY BACK INTO HIS GRACES, SADAT WILL DOUBTLESS ACCEPT A RECONCILIATION AND CONTINUE

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TO DEAL WITH THE PLO CHIEF, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY NO LONGER EXCLUSIVELY.

7. IF THE COMPREHENSIVE OR PARTIAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT CONCEPTS CITED ABOVE FAIL TO MATERIALIZE, BECAUSE

OF ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND USG UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO PRESS ISRAEL TO DO SO, SADAT WILL BE FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE OF DISENGAGING FROM THE PROCESS (PARA 4 REFTEL) OR CONSIDERING A BILATERAL AGREEMENT. IF HE CHOOSES TO DISENGAGE, IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE A COMPLETE DISENGAGEMENT, BUT ONE IN WHICH HE WOULD RENEW HIS EFFORTS THROUGH THE U.S., THE EUROPEANS AND THE UN TO GET A MORE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS RESUMED SOMEWHERE. HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WITHDRAW HIS "NO WAR" PLEDGE MADE IN ISRAEL IN JERUSALEM OR WHETHER TO CONTINUE HIS PEACE QUEST WITH THE PLEDGE STILL IN EFFECT. HE WOULD LOSE CONSIDERABLE FACE AT HOME AND ABROAD IF THERE IS A COMPLETE FAILURE, BUT COULD PROBABLY WITH SOME FANCY POLITICAL FOOTWORK SAVE HIMSELF. WE SHOULD NEVER UNDERESTIMATE HIS CUNNING. IF HE CAN FIND ANY REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE STRONGLY TEMPTED TO GO FOR EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IF (A) THE DEAL IS A GOOD ONE AND (B) HE CAN DEVISE SOME WAY TO MAKE IT APPEAR AT HOME AND ABROAD AS SIMPLY ANOTHER STEP IN THE OVERALL ARAB EFFORT FOR PEACE. HE HAS ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION IN THE PAST FEW YEARS SAID TO ME THAT, IF THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS DO NOT PLAY BALL, HE WILL GO IT ALONE. HERE AGAIN, HOWEVER, WHAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CONSIDER A GENEROUS EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI SETTLEMENT MAY BE LESS THAN SADAT'S MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS. WE HERE SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW WHAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO FOR A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT.

8. SHOULD SADAT AT ANY TIME BE TEMPTED TO OPT FOR A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT, HE WOULD DOUBTLESS WEIGH CAREFULLY
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HIS SURVIVABILITY SITUATION (PARA 8 REFTEL) AT THE MOMENT. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WOULD CONCLUDE THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC WOULD SUPPORT IT, ESPECIALLY IF IT COULD BE FANCILY PACKAGED AND THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS COULD BE EXCORIATED FOR LOSING ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY. EGYPTIANS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE LEFT, THE NASSERISTS AND SOME INTELLECTUALS, DESPERATELY ALL WANT PEACE. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO ARE CLOSE TO PLO LEADERSHIP, ARE FED UP WITH THE PALESTINIANS. SADAT HAS SHREWDLY SENSED THE PREVAILING PUBLIC MOOD AND WOULD PRESENT HIS ACTION IN TERMS OF NO MORE WIDOWS, WAR ORPHANS, ETC. THERE IS NO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE INFLUENCED BY SAUDI ATTITUDES AND, IN THE CASE OF THE RE-EMERGING YOUNGER ISLAMIC MILITANT GROUPS, BY LIBYAN MONEY. BUT SADAT WOULD RECOGNIZE THE RISKS AND WOULD CLEARLY NOT ATTEMPT SUCH AN ACTION WITHOUT PREPARING HIMSELF THROUGH RIGOROUS SECURITY MEASURES. MUCH WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND UPON

THE LOYALTY AND CAPABILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES.

9. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW THE MILITARY WOULD REACT. GAMASY, THOUGH DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES, HAS TOLD ME HE WILL FOLLOW HIM TO THE END. BUT DOES THE END MEAN A BILATERAL AGREEMENT? I BELIEVE THAT IF SADAT COULD DEMONSTRATE TO GAMASY AND THE SENIOR COMMANDERS THAT HE HAD NO CHOICE AND AGAIN RAP IT UP IN SOME FASHION THAT SUGGESTS IT IS LESS THAN TOTAL PEACE, THEY WOULD BUY IT, EVEN IF A BIT RELUCTANTLY. WE HEAR OF SOME GRUMBLING ON THE PART OF SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS AND SOME AIR FORCE OFFICERS, BUT IF THE SENIOR COMMANDERS CONCURRED, THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE MANAGEABLE. IN ANY CASE, SADAT WOULD DOUBTLESS CLOSELY
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MONITOR MILITARY REACTION. THERE IS NO GAINSAYING THAT AT THE MOMENT AT LEAST, THE EGYPTIAN MASSES AND MILITARY ARE CAUGHT UP IN A PHARONIC, NATIONALIST BINGE, WHICH INEVITABLY BRINGS OUT THE LATENT EGYPTIAN FEELINGS OF CONTEMPT FOR "THOSE OTHER ARABS." THIS IS AS TRUE AMONG THE MILITARY, AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SAMPLE MILITARY ATTITUDES, AS AMONG CIVILIANS. BUT EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES, PUBLIC AND MILITARY, ARE BAROMETRIC, AND MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

10. SADAT WILL CERTAINLY HAVE TO TAKE SAUDI ATTITUDES INTO ACCOUNT, BUT IN MY JUDGMENT HE WILL NOT VIEW THESE AS ANY GREAT DETERRENT. GRANTED, HE NEEDS CONTINUED SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT. BUT THE SAUDIS ALSO NEED HIM. THEY--AND ESPECIALLY THE ROYAL FAMILY--WILL NOT WANT TO BE ALONE WITH SYRIANS, IRAQIS AND REJECTIONISTS. THE SAUDI RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT IS A KIND OF INSURANCE FOR THE ROYAL FAMILY, SECOND IN IMPORTANCE ONLY TO THE U.S.-SAUDI "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" THAT THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP HAS FOR YEARS SOUGHT. HOWEVER UNHAPPY SAUDIS MAY BE WITH SADAT, SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY WILL NOT READILY JETTISON SADAT FOR GOOD. WE HAVE DIFFERENT VERSIONS AS TO WHAT RECENTLY TRANSPIRED BETWEEN MARWAN AND KHALID/FAHD, BUT SADAT IS AT THE MOMENT UNCONCERNED ABOUT SAUDI REACTION AND IS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL COME AROUND. AND THEY WILL. DESPITE THEIR THREATS TO HALT ECONOMIC HELP, I SUBMIT THAT THE SAUDIS AFTER AN INITIAL PERIOD OF UNHAPPINESS, WOULD GRUDGING COME AROUND TO AT LEAST TACIT SUPPORT FOR A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER UNHAPPY THEY MIGHT BE ABOUT IT. SAUDIS SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO ANTAGONIZE SADAT TOO MUCH. THE ROYAL FAMILY IS WELL AWARE OF EGYPTIAN EFFORTS PRIOR TO JUNE 1967 TO SUBVERT AND FOMENT REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS. IT WAS THE STRENGTH OF A FAYSAL THAT PREVENTED NASSER FROM SUCCEEDING, BUT EVEN THEN IT WAS A CLOSE THING. NEITHER KHALID NOR FAHD IS A FAYSAL. I DOUBT THAT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY WOULD BE MUCH AFFECTED

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BY SAUDI REACTION, ALTHOUGH I AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT ALL OF THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE NATURE OF THE BILATERAL SETTLEMENT.

11. RE PARA 12, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT IS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE LEGITIMIZED BY THE PARTIES WHO SIGN IT. CONCEIVABLY, UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT TAKE NOTE OF IT. IT WOULD CERTAINLY DEEPEN DIVISIONS IN ARAB WORLD AND WOULD AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM UNITE REJECTIONIST ELEMENTS, INCLUDING PERHAPS SYRIA. BUT IT MIGHT ALSO FORCE SYRIANS AND PERHAPS PALESTINIANS TO RETHINK THEIR STRATEGY AND, AS INDICATED PARA 14 REFTTEL, IT COULD THEORETICALLY OPEN THE WAY TO A GRADUAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT MADE UP OF DISCRETE SEGMENTS. I WOULD THINK, HOWEVER, THAT GIVEN WEAK POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN SYRIA, IT WOULD TAKE ASSAD SOME TIME BEFORE HE FELT HE COULD TRY THE WATER. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE ASSAD WAS IN EFFECT SETTING THE PACE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, AND SEEMED TO BE IN NO HURRY TO GET TO GENEVA, THAT SADAT DECIDED HE WOULD WAIT NO LONGER.

12. RE PARA 16, THERE ARE CERTAINLY DANGERS TO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT. SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT FOR A TIME CUT ITS SUBSIDY TO EGYPT, BUT I DARESAY THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PUSH USG TO PICK UP THE SLACK AND THERE MIGHT EVEN BE SOME CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS, AT LEAST FOR A TIME. IT WOULD RAISE EXPECTATIONS OF ECONOMIC BETTERMENT AMONG EGYPTIAN MASSES, BUT THIS WOULD ALSO BE TRUE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND WILL IN ANY CASE ONE DAY HAVE TO BE FACED. SADAT'S UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM WOULD NOT SIMPLY BE THOSE DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY, BUT ALSO THE MANY SKILLED AND UNSKILLED EGYPTIANS WORKING ABROAD
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WHO WOULD BE SENT HOME. NOT ONLY WOULD THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING JOBS, BUT THEIR REMITTANCES WOULD STOP AND ADD TO GOE'S FINANCIAL WOES. (THESE ECONOMIC CONCERNS ARE BOUTROS GHALI'S PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT.) THE DANGER OF ASSASSINATION OF MODERATE LEADERS WOULD BE HEIGHTENED, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE FAR FROM LOW AT THE MOMENT.

13. I QUESTION WHETHER WE WOULD ONLY FIND OURSELVES ALLIED WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THE SAUDIS BADLY WANT THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH US AND A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WILL NOT CHANGE THIS IN ANY WAY. NOR AM I CONVINCED THAT EVEN ASSAD WOULD WANT TO DROP ALL OF HIS TIES WITH US,

THOUGH A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD, OF COURSE, MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM. I SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT EAGER FOR A DANGEROUS RISE IN ME TENSIONS.

THOUGH I WISH I WERE PERSUADED THAT THEY REALLY WANT A SETTLEMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ONLY WAY THEY CAN HOPE TO REGAIN THEIR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS BY WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT FOR THE SYRIANS, IRAQIS AND PALESTINIANS. IN EGYPT, THEY ARE PRACTICALLY OUT AND RETAIN ONLY OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC LICENSE PLATE "NO. 1" AS A SAD REMINDER OF THEIR ONCE PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE HERE.

14. RE PARA 19 REFTTEL, IT IS DIFFICULT AT THIS POINT TO PREDICT WHICH OF THE SCENARIOS WILL ENSUE. SADAT HAS CERTAINLY NOT THOUGHT THEM THROUGH, BUT AT THE MOMENT IS AT LEAST TAKING FOR GRANTED DOMESTIC AND SAUDI SUPPORT. HOWEVER, SADAT IS NO FOOL AND THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT HE CAN EASILY BE INDUCED TO ACCEPT A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT. IF THE ISRAELIS WANT ONE, THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO PAY A PRICE FOR IT AND I SUSPECT A HIGHER PRICE THAN THEY THINK. ALSO, ALTHOUGH HE IS ANXIOUS FOR THE PEACE EFFORT TO ACCELERATE, HE HAS MUCH MORE PATIENCE THAN RECENT EVENTS MIGHT SUGGEST.

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15. THE ISRAELIS WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO WEIGH THE RISK THAT A SUCCESSION GOVT MIGHT AT SOME POINT DISAVOW THE AGREEMENT. PROSPECTS OF THIS ARE LESSENED, IN MY VIEW, IF THE AGREEMENT IS A GOOD ONE, BUT THE POSSIBILITY WILL ALWAYS EXIST SO LONG AS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED.

16. IF SADAT DECIDES TO GO AHEAD ON HIS OWN, AND HE IS NOT RPT NOT AT THE MOMENT HELL BENT ON THIS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT IT. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ON HIM AND THE ISRAELIS THAT THEIR (AND OUR) OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, EVEN IF THIS CANNOT YET EMERGE FROM THE CAIRO PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. WHILE WE WILL NOW HAVE DIRECT EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI TALKS, AS WE AND THE ISRAELIS AHVE LONG WANTED, THE SUCCESS OF THOSE TALKS WILL STILL DEPEND LARGELY UPON OUR EFFORTS WITH BOTH PARTIES TO PERSUADE THEM TO MAKE NEEDED CONCESSIONS. WE DO NOT PUBLICLY HAVE TO RULE OUT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT (PARA 24) AND CAN CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH I DARESAY THAT THIS COULD GIVE US A FEW DOMESTIC PROBLEMS IN U.S. IT IS PERHAPS INEVITABLE, GIVEN OUR ROLE IN THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS, THAT ALL MIDDLE EAST PARTIES (EGYPTIANS INCLUDED) AND SOVIETS BELIEVE WE ARE CONSPIRING TO BRING ABOUT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. ANYONE WHO TRIES TO ASSIST THE PARTIES TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES IS BY

NATURE A WHIPPING BOY.

17. I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH PARA 24 REFTL. EILTS
UNQUOTE VANCE

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